AN ISLAND NATION

Do you think we can afford to to uh disarm at this point or what is your feeling in that regard? Well, we have certainly no intention of disarming. Uh what we are talking about in the salt negotiations uh is not disarmament but a limitation of arms where we limit what we do and they limit what they do. And the very thing that you refer to makes it very important for us to pursue those negotiations. One other point I would make briefly is this. What the Soviet Union needs in terms of military preparedness is different from what we need. They're a land power primarily uh with a great potential enemy on the east. We're primarily, of course, a sea power and uh our needs therefore are different. We're in Ireland. We're stuck right out there by ourselves with frankly damn few friends. And we've got to protect ourselves. And we've got to be able to get our people, if necessary, across these sea lions to assist our allies, who in turn will help protect us. [music] [music] [music] Yesterday, December 7th, 1941, a day left and The United States of America was suddenly been literally attacked by Navy forces of the Empire Japan. The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Like that. [music] [music] [music] Heat. Heat. [music] [music] [music] [music] [music] History has always taught us that any organization, particularly that of the United States and most especially the United States Navy, must be prepared, ready, and above all must have a clear sense of mission as organizations, as human beings. In order for us truly to be ready and prepared, we must have this understanding of mission. I always like to break down the mission of the United States Navy into four principal parts. The first is our contribution to the nation's strategic second strike nuclear capability. The remaining three are conventional missions. Sea control, projection of power and overseas presence. The first uh element of sea power that's always mentioned is the one of strategic deterrence. Navy's role of course is principally reflected in the fleet ballistic missile submarine weapon system with the Polaris and the Poseidon missiles. And this I consider the most survivable system that the country has. The Polaris submarines are mobile. Nobody knows except us where they are at any given moment. They're difficult to detect and their rapid fire launching capability uh would enable them to get off their missiles in a very short period of time in case anyone chose to attack us with a nuclear system. The Polaris system is backed up by our attack carriers. This is in effect the totality of our seabbase strategic deterrent system. It's part of the Triad. The Triad is simply our our submarine ballistic missile weapon system, our man bombers, and our land-based ICBMs. The strategic balance has been impacted as a result of Mr. Nixon's opening to the People's Republic of China, his trip to Moscow to negotiate or to finish the negotiation of the ABM treaty and the executive agreement on limitation on offensive arms. These trips and these negotiations take us a significant step further down the road toward that multipolar world uh in which we're headed for a series of superpowers in the out years. Uh the treaty ensures that in so far as it is possible to forecast these things in terms of ongoing technology, each side will retain a very high capability to do massive damage to the other in a second strike. So in a very gross sense, the judgment is that there is about parody before somebody strikes first. By sea control, I refer to that combination of forces which makes it possible for us to control and use the seas and to deny their use to any potential adversary. Included within this mix of forces are our anti-submarine warfare aircraft, our P3s operating from land bases. our aircraft carriers with in the other strike aircraft embarked capable of dealing with the surface ship or surfaced submarine. I include also within sea control our destroyers capable of dealing with the surface ship, the enemy submarine and with aircraft and of course our attack submarines which form a very important part of our effort to deal with the enemy's submarines. The United States is a relatively small, a limited, heavily populated land area. We are as land efficient with respect to today's weapons as England was with respect to the weapons of World War II. We are compelled as England was in World War I and two, compelled to rely on the sea not only for the deployment of its mo big weapons, but to rally the resources and populations of the rest of the free world and bring them to bear against the enemy. England could not possibly have stood alone. If her seal lanes had been interrupted for a matter of weeks, England would die. England's military power would die. So it is with the United States today. We are a have not nation. We must import I believe over 70 of our strategic materials. So I am suggesting unless we can bring in these strategic materials regardless of the threat the country will die and the US military force is not doing anything or going anywhere if we are denied these strategic materials particularly oil. There are three fundamental parts to our Navy's capability to project its power. The first is our aircraft carrier again with its strike aircraft accompanied by fighter escort capable of projecting itself some 600 miles inland around the Eurasian perimeter or wherever else required. Second, our amphibious opponent is our merchant marine, which in the Southeast Asia war has carried some 96% of the millions of tons necessary to support ourselves and our allies and which even in a war in the late 70s would have to carry 94% of those same millions of tons. It's important for us to remember that even for that 6% that goes in by air, the airlift aircraft which have carried it must be refueled overseas by aviation gasoline which must have traveled on the surface of the seas. It's been the role of the seventh fleet really since World War II to project power and support that projection. one of the how does the the sailor and the crewman uh fit into uh projecting our sea power? I think that uh I couldn't give you a better example than to say that the that the multicolored shirts on the flight deck for example uh the guy down in the engine room that's making the steam that not only fires the cats but propels the carrier through the water at speeds required to get the wind over the deck we need and name any aspect of it you like. They are in fact the projectors of naval power. With overseas presence, I refer to our permanent capability to maintain forces in the Mediterranean with our sixth fleet and in the Western Pacific with our seventh fleet and wherever else required by our commanderin-chief. For example, our occasional peacetime sorties by the second fleet up to the northern Atlantic, the deployment of forces into the Indian Ocean to deal with the crisis in the subcontinent and wherever else required in times of normaly or in times of crisis as long as there are nations and peoples of the world who want to be a little aggressive while you've got to be able to defend yourself. So you end up with a with a navy. This is a traditional pattern, logical pattern more than traditional. It's just a logical way to do things. And uh out of this uh we then have a a requirement to be around the world in many places to ensure that our presence is protected. Now you can do it a lot of ways. You can put a lot of troops ashore and we've found that as a requirement in many cases and it sometimes that's the best way to do it. Uh, one of the nice things about doing it uh with the Navy ships is you can maintain a low profile if you want to just show the flag or just be fairly close to stabilize uh the the feelings of a foreign government or your own people in that in that particular country. Uh this is a nice easy lowprofile method in which it can be accomplished. And so uh our role is to uh kind of project a little bit of America overseas. The ship in which we're standing here is really kind of a piece of the United States. I think it's important for us to be aware as we look at the problem our Navy faces of the action and reaction process that has taken place over the years. Because we ended World War II in overwhelming superiority at sea and because our potential adversaries had almost no navies, they built in a sequential series a capability designed first to deny us the use of the seas rather than to control and use it themselves. And the first step in this process was to go in for very large submarine fleets. Having achieved a large submarine capability, the next step on the part of the potential adversary was to build some 15 years before we in the United States Navy started it, a cruise missile which they have proceeded to install on their aircraft, their surface ships and their submarines. And this enhanced further their capability to deny us the use of the seas with our very large fleet. Far as they could go, they have now reached the point where they're embarked on the fifth and final stage, namely the construction of their first true aircraft carrier. This has been a process which has made it very necessary for us in the United States Navy to reoptimize against this growing threat. Let me speak for a moment now about uh our future with regard to our Navy's capability in the field of strategic second strike capability. We're going forward from that of the 1960s, our Polaris system, and that of the 1970s, our Poseidon system, which was a different missile in the same hole to the construction of a new system, the Trident system. This will be a new submarine and a new missile. The missile will be longer in range and the new submarine will have much greater survivability and the combination will make it possible for us to stay ahead of any possible combination of anti-ubmarine capability on the part of potential adversaries. with regard to our forces that will make up both sea control and projection forces and which will be used of course in peace time for overseas presence. We are going forward with the concept of a high low mix in the field of the so-called high end of the spectrum. We will have an expensive uh series of ships which will be very highly effective. our nuclear carriers, giving us the capability to have a total of four, two based on each continental coast, ready for rapid reinforcement of our overseas conventionally powered carriers. And with that strike carrier, of course, the F-14, S3, the series of very sophisticated uh strike aircraft, the A6E, A7E, and so forth. the continuing stream of attack submarines of the 688 class. And then at the low end ship, a small flattop capable of carrying up to 17 helicopters or vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. a new patrol. Of course, at the same time, uh moving forward rapidly to bring into our fleet the Harpoon missile, which will be our first true cruise missile, capable of being installed on ships of any size all the way from the very small hydrophoil to our very large ships. And this will get us fully back into the ball game with regard to the cruise missile threat. Our outy years will bring us the exciting surface effects ship. Sitrep has I hope served to indicate to you the very great importance of the Navy's mission and the tremendous responsibility which it places on all those who serve. You've seen a great deal about our new plans for new weapon systems. And yet it very literally is true that none of these systems can be brought into place to help the Navy carry out its mission without the men and women who have dedicated themselves to the service of the United States Navy. In a very literal [music] sense, our capability to control the seas, to project our power, to be overseas, to maintain a presence is a function of our people. We can and women, it will never be possible to fulfill our mission. [music] [music]